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CASE NOTES
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT-NO IMPROPER
WITHHOLDING IF RECORDS ARE REMOVED FROM
AGENCY PRIOR TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
REQUEST-Kissinger v. Reporter's Committee for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
Henry Kissinger was appointed Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs in January 1969. In September
1973, he was appointed Secretary of State. However, he re-
tained an advisory position with the National Security Coun-
cil until 1975. Throughout his tenure of office, Kissinger's sec-
retaries monitored and made transcripts of his telephone
conversations. In October 1976, shortly before he left the
State Department, Kissinger removed the transcripts from the
department. Eventually, he deeded them to the Library of
Congress.'
Kissinger did not receive permission to remove the docu-
ments from any of the federal agencies responsible for docu-
ment maintenance. However, he received an opinion from the
Legal Advisor to the State Department that the transcripts
were private, not agency, records. When Kissinger removed
the records, there was no State Department review of their
contents.2
While Kissinger was Secretary of State, three different
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)s requests for transcripts
of his telephone conversations were filed with the State De-
partment. William Safire, a New York Times columnist, filed
his request before the transcripts were removed from the
State Department.' The Military Audit Project (MAP) and
0 1981 by Teresa Craigie
1. Kissinger v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 139-41
(1980).
2. Id. at 140-41.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
4. 445 U.S. at 142-43. Safire requested transcripts of those conversations be-
tween January 21, 1969 and February 12, 1971 in which either his name appeared or
Kissinger discussed leaks with certain named officials. Id.
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the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP)
filed their requests after the transcripts had been removed.
The State Department denied all three requests. The De-
partment reasoned that Safire sought transcripts made while
Kissinger was National Security Advisor, and, therefore, the
transcripts were not agency records subject to FOIA disclo-
sure. Safire argued unsuccessfully on administrative appeal
that the location of the transcripts in the State Department
rendered them agency records. The State Department denied
the MAP request by stating that the transcripts were not
agency records and that the department no longer had cus-
tody and control over the transcripts. MAP filed an adminis-
trative appeal, but the decision was affirmed. The State De-
partment denied the RCFP request for the same reasons given
to MAP.'
The three parties then filed suit in federal district court,
naming Kissinger, the Library of Congress, the Secretary of
State, and the State Department as defendants. Plaintiffs
sought a judgment declaring that the transcripts were "agency
records"'7 subject to FOIA disclosure, and that they had been
improperly removed and withheld. Plaintiffs requested the
court to compel the Library of Congress to return the docu-
ments to the State Department with directions to process
them for FOIA disclosure.'
On summary judgment, the district court held that the
documents produced while Kissinger was Secretary of State
were agency records. In addition, the court concluded that the
transcripts had been wrongfully removed because there had
been no prior approval by the responsible agency. The court
acknowledged that the Library of Congress was not an agency
subject to FOIA disclosure requirements, but invoked its equi-
table powers and ordered the Library to return the transcripts
to the State Department. The order further required the De-
partment to determine which transcript summaries were ex-
empt from FOIA and to provide the non-exempt documents
5. Id. at 143-44. MAP requested all the transcripts made while Kissinger was
Secretary of State. RCFP sought the transcripts made while Kissinger was Secretary
of State and National Security Advisor. Id.
6. Id.
7. Under FOIA, only agency records are subject to disclosure requirements. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
8. 445 U.S. at 144-45.
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to plaintiffs. Relying on the mistaken assumption that the re-
quest for transcripts made while Kissinger was National Se-
curity Advisor had been withdrawn, the court denied those
requests.'
Both parties appealed the lower court decision. The court
of appeals affirmed the holding that the transcripts made
while Kissinger was Secretary of State were agency records
subject to FOIA disclosure. As to the request for the summa-
ries made while Kissinger was National Security Advisor, al-
though it had not been withdrawn, the court held those docu-
ments need not be produced. Both Kissinger and RCFP filed
petitions for certiorari.' 0
Affirming in part and reversing in part, the United States
Supreme Court first reviewed the MAP and RCFP requests.
The Court held that the district court had no authority to or-
der the transfer of the transcripts from the Library of Con-
gress to the State Department."
In determining whether the district court had jurisdiction
to order the transfer of the transcripts from the Library of
Congress, the Court looked first to the Federal Records Acts.'
9. Id. at 145.
10. Id. at 145-46.
11. Id. at 146-55.
12. There are two Records Acts, the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-
3107 (1976), and the Federal Records Disposal Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3314 (1976).
Section 2902 of the Records Act states the objectives of both acts:
It is the purpose of this chapter, and chapters 21, 31, and 33 of this title,
to require the establishment of standards and procedures to assure effi-
cient and effective records management. Such records management
standards and procedures shall seek to implement the following goals:
(1) Accurate and complete documentation of the policies and transac-
tions of the Federal Government.
(2) Control of the quantity and quality of records produced by the
Federal Government.
(3) Establishment and maintenance of mechanisms of control with re-
spect to records creation in order to prevent the creation of unnecessary
records and with respect to the effective and economical operations of
an agency.
(4) Simplification of the activities, systems, and processes of records
creation and of records maintenance and use.
(5) Judicious preservation and disposal of records.
(6) Direction of continuing attention on records from their initial crea-
tion to their final disposition, with particular emphasis on the preven-
tion of unnecessary Federal paperwork.
(7) Establishment and maintenance of such other systems or tech-
niques as the Administrator considers necessary to carry out the pur-
poses of this chapter, and chapters 21, 31, and 33 of this title.
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Assuming that Kissinger wrongfully removed the transcripts,
the Court nevertheless denied MAP's and RCFP's prayer for
return of the transcripts to the State Department. The Court
found that the Records Acts do not expressly provide for a
private cause of action' s and refused to imply such a right.
The Court first reasoned that the Acts only proscribe specific
conduct by government officials; they do not provide private
individuals with rights to inspect government documents. Sec-
ondly, the Court reasoned that, since the Records Acts al-
ready provide for administrative remedies, the Court should
be "wary of reading others into it."" Finally, the Court deter-
mined that the purpose of the Acts is to aid federal govern-
ment by establishing a system of records maintenance rather
than to protect the rights of private citizens. 1
The Court next considered whether FOIA, unlike the
Records Acts, provides plaintiffs with a private cause of ac-
tion. The Court acknowledged that Congress enacted FOIA to
foster public access to otherwise unavailable agency records.
However, the Court determined that the statute authorizes
the federal courts to order disclosure only where an agency
has (1) improperly; (2) withheld; (3) agency records." The
Court further determined that a plaintiff must make a show-
ing of all three requirements before the courts can exercise
jurisdiction.17
The Court held that the district court had no jurisdiction
to order return of the transcripts because there had been no
improper withholding.'" The Court reasoned that there is no
The Records Acts provide effective management of government records; the
Records Disposal Act provides efficient systems for the disposal of obsolete records.
44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-3314. (Both acts will be referred to as the Records Acts.)
13. The Records Acts were not enacted to give private citizens the right to in-
spect government records, or to protect them from mismanagement of government
records. 44 U.S.C. § 2902 (1976). The purpose of the Acts is to aid government. See
note 12 supra.
14. 445 U.S. at 149 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
15. 445 U.S. at 149.
16. FOIA provides: "On complaint, the district court .. .has jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of
any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
17. 445 U.S. at 150.
18. Id. Since the Court held there was no improper withholding, it was unneces-
sary to determine whether the transcripts were "agency records." The Court only had
to show that one of the requirements had not been contravened. Id. at 146-47.
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withholding where the document has been removed from
agency possession prior to the request. Rejecting plaintiffs' ar-
gument that refusal to institute legal proceedings to retrieve
the documents constitutes withholding, the Court ruled that
the usual meaning of "withhold" presupposes possession or
control. The Court noted that neither FOIA nor its legislative
history define "withhold." Therefore, the Court scrutinized
the structure and purpose of FOIA and found that Congress
intended to use "withhold" in its normal sense; the agency
must have possession or control of the documents and not
merely fail to sue third parties.1
The Court looked to three sources which suggest that
agency possession or control is a prerequisite to triggering
FOIA disclosure requirements. First, legislative debates sug-
gest that the purpose of FOIA is to allow "access to informa-
tion possessed by Government servants. '20 Second, the Attor-
ney General's guidelines issued pursuant to FOIA state that
FOIA is applicable "only to records in being and in possession
or control of an agency.''12 Finally, court decisions indicate
that FOIA only requires agencies to disclose those agency
records over which they have possession or control.2
The Court then considered the purposes of FOIA. The
Court found that the Act does not impose obligations on agen-
cies either to create or retain records.28 Rather, the purpose of
FOIA is to provide access to government records. The Court
reasoned, first, that if FOIA does not require an agency to cre-
ate or retain records, it cannot require an agency to retrieve
documents which are no longer in its possession. Whether an
agency decides to remove, or not create or retain, records, the
effect is the same on a FOIA request. The documents will not
be available to the requester.2
4
19. Id. at 151.
20. Id. (quoting 112 CONG. Rac. 13007 (1966) (Remarks of Rep. Monagan)).
21. 445 U.S. at 151 (quoting Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public
Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act, 23-24 (June 1967).).
22. 445 U.S. at 151-52. Here, the Court relied on dicta in NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co. 437 U.S. 214 (1978) which states: "FOIA requires the records and
materials in possession of federal agencies be made available on demand to any mem-
ber of the general public." Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
In Robbins, the Court held that the witness statements requested fell within the
nine statutory exemptions and, therefore, were not subject to FOIA disclosure. Id. at
242-43.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. 445 U.S. at 152-53.
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Secondly, considering further the purpose of FOIA, the
Court looked to the procedural provisions of the Act to deter-
mine whether Congress intended to oblige agencies to retrieve
documents at the request of private individuals. Sections
552(a)(6)(A) and (B) of FOIA provide a ten day extension in
the event an agency is unable to respond to a request within
ten days. The Court concluded that the purpose of this statu-
tory exemption is to provide time for searching and collecting
rather than litigation; litigation would clearly take more than
ten days.
In addition, the Court looked to Section 552(a)(4)(A) of
FOIA which allows an agency to set fees for direct costs of
document searches and duplications. When the search is ex-
tensive, the agency may apportion costs to the requester. The
Court reasoned that the permissible costs are those which an
agency normally incurs in complying with a FOIA request. It
is unlikely that Congress intended that the costs of a "search"
include litigation expenses; hence an agency search was not
meant to include initiation of legal proceedings.2 5
In conclusion, the Court held that Congress never in-
tended FOIA to displace the Records Acts. The purpose of the
Records Acts is to safeguard against, and retrieve, wrongfully
removed agency records.2 6
To summarize, the Court found that its definition of
"withhold" disposed of both the MAP and RCFP requests.
The plaintiffs filed their requests after the transcripts had
been removed from the State Department. Since Kissinger
and the Library of Congress had control and possession of the
transcripts, and the State Department had lost possession and
control, there was no withholding of agency records. Without
a showing that records had been withheld, plaintiffs could not
establish liability in a FOIA suit.2 7
The Court dealt with the Safire request separately. Safire
requested transcripts of conversations from Kissinger's tenure
as National Security Advisor. After Kissinger was appointed
25. Id. at 153-54.
26. Id. at 154. The Court noted that recent Supreme Court cases support this
holding. Both Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft, 415 U.S. 1 (1974), and NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978), provide that FOIA does not depart
from prior practices; the intent of the Act is to provide access to government records.
445 U.S. at 154.
27. Id. at 154-55.
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Secretary of State, the transcripts were transferred to the
State Department. The Court held that the transcripts are
not agency records and, therefore, do not fall within the pur-
view of the Act.28
The Court acknowledged that, under FOIA, the Executive
Office of the President is an agency. But, looking to the legis-
lative history, the Court found that the Executive Office does
not include the Office of the President or his immediate per-
sonal staff. Since Safire's request was for transcripts made
while Kissinger was Assistant to the President, the Court con-
cluded that the transcripts were not agency records when
made. 9
Next, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the
transcripts made while Kissinger was National Security Advi-
sor may have been National Security Council records and,
therefore, subject to FOIA80 The Court reasoned that when
Safire requested transcripts from those conversations relating
to the internal secrecy of the White House, he requested tran-
scripts of conversations in which Kissinger was acting only in
his capacity as presidential advisor. The Court further rea-
soned that when Safire requested those documents in which
his name appeared, he never asserted that those documents
were National Security Council documents; he maintained
that they were State Department documents. Thus the Court
found no need to address the issue of whether the State De-
partment violated the Act by refusing to produce the records
of another agency.-1
Rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the transcripts were
agency documents because they had been on file in the State
Department, the Court stated that "[W]e simply decline to
hold that the physical location of the notes of the telephone
conversations render them 'agency records.' "32 The Court ar-
gued that the transcripts were not generated or controlled by
the State Department. Further, they served no State Depart-
28. Id. at 157. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. See Forsham v. Harris,
445 U.S. 169 (1980), a companion case to Kissinger decided on the same date, where
the Court also construes the term "agency records" under FOIA.
29. Id. at 156.
30. The Court declined to decide when the transcripts could become National
Security Council records under FOIA. Id.
31. Id. at 156-57.
32. Id. at 157.
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ment purpose. Concluding that the transcripts were not
agency records, the Court upheld the lower court's refusal to
order disclosure.3 3
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
agreed with the Court that there is no withholding unless the
agency has either custody or control of the records. However,
he rejected the Court's approach which equates custody with
physical possession. Stevens argued that there is a withhold-
ing if an agency has legal custody of, or a legal right to,
records but declines to retrieve them.34
Stevens also argued that the majority's conclusion is in-
consistent with the congressional purpose behind FOIA. The
purpose of FOIA is to provide maximum disclosure of govern-
ment documents to private citizens.85 But, Stevens noted, this
decision exempts wrongfully removed documents from the
disclosure requirements. Stevens expressed a fear that govern-
ment officials could avoid FOIA requests by removing poten-
tially embarrassing documents from their files."
Concurring and dissenting, Justice Brennan agreed with
the majority's conclusion that FOIA disclosure should not be
conditioned on the legality of a removal. However, he dis-
agreed with the Court's holding that FOIA could not reach
previously removed documents. Acknowledging Stevens' defi-
nition of improper withholding as the most workable, Bren-
nan urged Congress to fashion a rule concerning the retention
of documents for FOIA purposes.37
The Kissinger decision provides that there is no improper
withholding under FOIA if the agency no longer possesses or
controls the documents requested by a private party.38 The
Court concluded that, because there was no withholding, the
district court did not have jurisdiction to order disclosure.3 '
33. Id. at 157-58.
34. Id. at 161-66 (dissenting opinion).
35. "This milestone law guarantees the right of persons to know about the busi-
ness of their government . . . [t]he law provides that anyone may obtain reasonably
identifiable records . . . from federal agencies." H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267, 6269 (1974).
36. 445 U.S. at 161 (dissenting opinion).
37. Id. at 158-60 (dissenting opinion).
Brennan argued that "[i]f FOIA is to be more than a dead letter, it must necessa-
rily incorporate some restraint upon the agency's powers to move documents beyond
the reach of the FOTA requester." Id. at 159.
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id. at 146-55.
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By ruling against the plaintiffs on the threshold issue of juris-
diction, the Court failed to consider whether its decision was
consistent with the Congressional intent underlying FOIA.
The result contradicts the Congressional purpose under-
lying FOIA to provide private citizens with access to all gov-
ernment documents, except those which the legislature has
specifically exempted.40 Prior cases construing FOIA have
held that FOIA should be liberally construed and the exemp-
tions should be narrowly interpreted in order to provide maxi-
mum disclosure.4 But, by narrowly interpreting "withhold,"
the Court avoided the legislative mandate of maximum
disclosure.
This result clearly contravenes the purpose of FOIA.42
But, more importantly, the decision may lead to serious in-
fringement of the right to access derived from the first
amendment. 43 If simple removal defeats FOIA disclosure obli-
gations, requesters may find documents removed. There is sig-
nificant potential for abuse. Agencies may systematically re-
move all important or embarrassing documents from the
agency's premises. 44 If FOIA remains unamended after Kis-
singer, private citizens will retain their right of access; how-
ever, the question remains whether removal of documents
may render the right meaningless.
The Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs on the
40. See note 35 supra.
41. In Robbins, the Court stated that "the Act is broadly conceived" and its
"'basic policy' is in favor of disclosure." 437 U.S. at 220. The Court held that the
witness statements requested were exempt under Section 552(b)(7)(A) and, therefore,
were not subject to FOIA disclosure. Id. at 242-43.
See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1972) and NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421
U.S. 132, 138 (1975).
42. Stevens argued that "[i]t is the creation of such an incentive, which is di-
rectly contrary to the purpose of FOIA, rather than the result in this particular case,
that prompts me to write in dissent." 445 U.S. at 161-62 (dissenting opinion).
43. The right to access is derived from the first amendment rights of freedom of
speech and press. Underlying these rights is the assumption that private citizens
must have the right to know; an individual's right to speak or publish is meaningless
without adequate information. The right to know necessarily implies a right to access
to government records. The right to know is ineffective without access to government
records because an individual would otherwise be unable to find adequate informa-
tion concerning government operations. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KNOW, 4 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
44. Stevens argued that the majority's holding "creates an incentive for outgo-
ing agency officials to remove potentially embarrassing documents from their files in
order to frustrate future FOIA requests." 445 U.S. at 161 (dissenting opinion).
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threshold issue of jurisdiction when it found that the district
court did not have the power to order the return of the docu-
ments to the State Department. It thus avoided questions
concerning the purpose of FOIA which is to provide maximum
disclosure of government records. The Kissinger decision al-
lows an agency to frustrate the Act by simple removal of doc-
uments from the agency's premises. Moreover, the holding
may seriously infringe on the right of access which will be-




COURT HAS JURISDICTION IN A FARM LABOR
DISPUTE TO ENJOIN PRIMARY PICKETING
THAT OBSTRUCTS ACCESS-Kaplan's Fruit &
Produce Co. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 60, 603 P.2d
1341, 160 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1980).
The Argicultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) certi-
fied' the United Farm Workers of America (Union) as the col-
lective bargaining agent for Kaplan's Fruit and Produce Com-
pany's (Kaplan's) Porterville farm in 1976.2 In November of
1977, after a collective bargaining agreement had not been
reached, the Union began to picket Kaplan's wholesale outlet
in Los Angeles.8 On December 9, 1977, Kaplan's obtained a
temporary restraining order against Union picketing but the
superior court denied the company's request for a preliminary
injunction.' The court found that although the evidence sup-
ported a charge of obstructed access, it failed to establish the
"violence or threat of violence" from the picketing which is
0 1981 by Mark Hannah
1. Certification is a major requirement of the ALRA. It is an unfair labor prac-
tice to bargain with, recognize, or sign a collective bargaining agreement with any
labor organization not certified pursuant to the Act. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153(f) (West
Supp. 1981). Basically the certification process requires that each bargaining repre-
sentative be elected by secret ballot and be confirmed by the ALRB as the fair winner
of the election. Aware of the crucial nature of the certification requirement, growers
have contested the certification of certain farm labor groups to remove any possibility
of reaching an early collective bargaining agreement, knowing that the charge would
be investigated and possibly appealed. For a discussion of the mechanics of the certi-
fication process, see Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 - La Es-
peranza de California para el Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783 (1975). For a
discussion of delay tactics used by the growers in the certification process, see
Rutkowski, Future of the United Farm Workers, 1978 SAN FERNANDO L. REV. 21.
2. 26 Cal. 3d 60, 66, 603 P.2d 1341, 1344, 160 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747.
3. Id. 603 P.2d at 1344, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 748. Both the ALRB and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court classified the picketing as a primary strike and not as a secondary
boycott. A primary strike is picketing directed against the employer with whom the
union has a dispute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1071 (5th ed. 1979). A secondary boy-
cott is picketing directed at one business establishment, with which there is no dis-
pute, to induce that business to put pressure on the employer with whom the union
has a primary dispute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1213 (5th ed. 1979). The distinction
between the two is crucial to construction of CAL. LAB. CODE § 1154.
4. 26 Cal. 3d at 66, 603 P.2d at 1344, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
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necessary for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.5
Concurrent with its action in superior court Kaplan's
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the ALRB, but upon
a determination that the Union had not conducted mass pick-
eting or blocked access, the Board declined to issue a com-
plaint.' The Board's finding was upheld on appeal to the
ALRB's general counsel who reasoned that the picketing was
"primary activity" conducted in a manner that did not violate
the provisions of the ALRA.7
Kaplan's then petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of
mandamus to compel the superior court to issue the prelimi-
nary injunction.' The court granted an alternative writ,' and
later issued a peremptory writ. The California Supreme Court
then granted a petition for hearing.10 -
By unanimous. judgment, in an opinion by Acting Chief
Justice Tobriner, with a separate opinion by Justice Newman,
the court held that neither the ALRA nor the Moscone Act"
divests the superior court of jurisdiction to enjoin farm labor
picketing that obstructs a primary employer's ingress and
egress.2The court used federal precedents as a guide to determine
the scope of jurisdictional preemption under California Labor
Code section 1.160.9 because "the ALRA apparently incorpo-
rates into California law the general features of the federal
preemption doctrine."3 Therefore, while the legislature has
5. Id., 603 P.2d at 1345, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
6. Id. at 66-67, 603 P.2d at 1345, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
7. Id. at 67, 603 P.2d at 1345, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
8. Id.
9. Id. Mandamus cannot displace the adequate legal remedy of appeal. The is-
suance of the alternative writ was a determination that Kaplan's appellate remedy
was inadequate, and that no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy existed except
the extraordinary writ. 5 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 92 (2d ed. 1971). The al-
ternative writ is a notice device whereby the respondent superior court must show
cause why the compelled act has not been performed. 43 CAL. JUR. 3d MANDAMUS &
PROHIBITION § 41 (1978). The issuance of the peremptory writ by the court of appeal
was a judgment for the applicant. 43 CAL. JUR. 3d Mandamus & Prohibition § 54
(1978).
10. 26 Cal. 3d at 67, 603 P.2d at 1345, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
11. Moscone Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1979).
12. 26 Cal. 3d at 65-66, 603 P.2d at 1344, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
13. People v. Medrano, 78 Cal. App. 3d 198, 205, 144 Cal. Rptr. 207, 221 (1978).
The California Supreme Court gave little credence to any other interpretation of CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1148 than the one supported by federal precedent. One commentator has
maintained that instead of blindly following federal precedent, the ALRB should con-
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mandated that the procedures of the ALRA "shall be the ex-
clusive method of redressing unfair labor practices," 4 the Act
also directs the courts to "follow the applicable precedents of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended."' 5
Consequently, the California Supreme Court applied the
controlling precedent of San Diego Unions v. Garmon."6 In
that case, the United States Supreme Court determined that
the test for preemption consists of a dual inquiry: exclusive
jurisdiction vests in the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) if the labor conduct either is arguably protected or is
arguably prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).'1 Subsequent decisions have recognized that the test
should not be applied in a "literal, mechanical fashion,"1 8 be-
cause local courts retain the power to adjudicate matters of
"particular local concern."19 The California Supreme Court
analyzed the issue of ALRA preemption by applying the two
part Garmon2 ° test. The court initially considered whether the
union activity was conduct "arguably protected" by the
ALRA, and subsequently focused on the possibility that the
union activity was conduct "arguably prohibited" by the
ALRA.
The court first concluded that the ALRB could not pre-
empt superior court jurisdiction under the doctrine of "argua-
bly protected activity."'21 Board intervention extends to union
activities specifically listed in California Labor Code section
sider separately those issues unique to the area of agriculture. Levy, supra note 1, at
788. For example, in the farm labor context, the issue of injunctive relief might be
considered "unique" by being different from those questions with which the ALRB is
primarily concerned. When compared with other labor organizations, an agricultural
farm labor union has an unusually brief time to be economically effective in a strike,
due to the short harvest season. For a detailed study of such factors, see Shatz, Pick-
eting Injunctions in California: A Study of the Role of the Courts in Farm Labor
Disputes, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 801 "(1977).
14. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.9 (West Supp. 1981).
15. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (West Supp. 1981).
16. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
17. Id. at 245.
18. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 188 (1978).
19. 26 Cal. 3d at 68, 603 P.2d at 1346, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
20. Id. at 70, 603 P.2d at 1347, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 750. This test has been fol-
lowed by the United States Supreme Court since the 1959 Garmon ruling, and was
recently applied in the 1978 Sears case.
21. Id.
19811 1173
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1152 as "protected, '22 and obstructive picketing is not such
enumerated activity.23 Therefore, the superior court could en-
join access obstruction provided that the injunction was nar-
rowly drawn to avoid infringement upon protected union con-
duct.24 The court rejected as "unsound" the contention of the
ALRB that even if the Union were innocent of obstructing ac-
cess, the balance of the picketing activity would be protected
primary activity under the Labor Code. The court pointed out
that Kaplan's sought to enjoin only the obstruction to ac-
cess,25 and that the Board could not invoke preemptive juris-
diction over activity "clearly unprotected. ' '21
The court next applied the "arguably prohibited" prong
of the Garmon test, and concluded that Board preemption
was precluded because the issues presented to the ALRB and
to the superior court were sufficiently distinct to minimize the
possibility of conflicting adjudications. The court relied on
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council
of Carpenters,27 in which the United States Supreme Court
stated that preemption by the regulatory Board hinged on the
need to avoid conflicting adjudications2 8 A court has jurisdic-
tion over matters of "particular local concern" only when an
adjudication will not unduly threaten interference with the
federal regulatory scheme.2 9 The Court in Sears held that a
trespass charge against a picketing labor union presented a
sufficiently distinct issue from the matters that the Board was
empowered to regulate.3 0 Even though the trespass occurred
during a labor dispute, risk of interference with the jurisdic-
22. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152 (West 1981).
23. 26 Cal. 3d at 70, 603 P.2d at 1347, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 750. The "protected
prong" of the ALRA, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152, like its NLRA § 7 counterpart, does not
expressly protect such activity. The activities guaranteed protection are self-organiza-
tion, the joining of labor organizations, collective bargaining, and other concerted ac-
tivity for mutual aid. The right to refrain from such activities is also protected. CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1981).
24. 26 Cal. 3d at 71, 603 P.2d at 1347, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
25. Id. at 70, 603 P.2d at 1347, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
26. Id. The court warned that it would be easy for the Board to gain jurisdic-
tion over areas reserved to the courts by the legislature. Such a move "would project
the Board's jurisdiction into all cases of charges against a union." Id. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the court defended its own mandated original jurisdiction from
this possible encroachment.
27. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
28. Id. at 189.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 198.
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tion of the NLRB was minimal. The courts would be con-
cerned with the action for trespass which involved only the
location of the picketing, while the Board would be faced with
a complex question regarding the objective of the picketing."1
The court then concluded that Board preemption would
occur if the obstructing access coerced agricultural employees
to join the union picketing of Kaplan's warehouse. The ALRA
prohibits any party to a farm labor dispute from infringing
upon any agricultural employee's rights protected in Califor-
nia Labor Code section 1152.2 The ALRB has jurisdiction if
the obstructed access "restrain[ed] or coerce[d]" agricultural
employees from the exercise of their protected rights under
the ALRA.33 One such protected activity is the right to refrain
from "any or all . . . activities" of the Union.-" The United
Farm Workers maintained that the preemptive power of the
Board was more comprehensive and was rightly invoked when
anyone, not merely agricultural employees, was adversely af-
fected by the obstructed access."' The Union based its claim
on the specific language found in California Labor Code sec-
tion 1154(d)3" which states that it is an unfair labor practice
for a union "to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person where
• . . an object thereof is . . . the following: . . . (2) forcing or
requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with a
struck employer."3 "
The court's persistent reliance on federal precedent, how-
ever, scuttled the Union's position.38 The court reasoned that
31. Id. The Board would be confronted with whether the picketing had a recog-
nizable work reassignment objective, which issue is completely irrelevant to the con-
cern of the state on a claim of trespass.
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1981).
33. Id.
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1981). See also note 23, supra.
35. 26 Cal. 3d at 72, 603 P.2d at 1348, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 751. Although there was
evidence that customers had been prevented from entering the store area, evidence
that employees had actually been "restrained or coerced" was discounted by the court
as being a "minor facet of the controversy." Id. at 71, 603 P.2d at 1348, 160 Cal. Rptr.
at 751. Therefore, the Union's reading of the Act as including "any person" was nec-
essary to prove the appropriateness of Board preemption.
36. Id. at 71, 603 P.2d at 1348, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
37. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1154(d)(2) (West Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
38. 26 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 603 P.2d at 1350, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 753. The ALRB and
the Union challenged the use of federalism to decide an issue concerning a state
agency and a state court. Both maintained that the United States Supreme Court"
recognized exceptions to the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction because of the potential
clash between the sovereign rights of states and the federal system. In other words,
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federal case law interpreting the construction of the NLRA
applied to this issue because the language of California Labor
Code section 1154 is "substantially identical" to that of the
federal labor law.3' The "substantially identical" section of
the NLRA was amended in 1959 by Congress so as not to ap-
ply to primary picketing activity, 0 and subsequent case law
limited that section to include prohibited conduct only in a
secondary boycott.4 1 The court similarly construed section
1154(d) as limited to the secondary boycott situation,'2 and
because the union activity involved primary picketing,'3 the
subdivision did not apply. Consequently, Board jurisdiction
was limited to the protection of agricultural employees"
under section 1154(a)(1). Obstruction of anyone else by the
primary picketing of Kaplan's warehouse was not an unfair
labor practice.'
Had the Union's premise proved persuasive, the superior
court could not have intervened because of a danger of con-
flicting adjudications. If the specialized treatment afforded ag-
ricultural employees were enlarged to protect everyone from
union restraint or coercion, as the Union urged, then both the
ALRB and the superior court would confront identical issues
of injunctive relief. The decision in Kaplan's Fruit obviates
this danger of conflicting adjudications; the Board is unable to
enjoin the access obstruction of customers, while the court is
not similarly constrained."
Finally, the court concluded that the Moscone Act fails to
divest the superior court of jurisdiction to enjoin the Union's
conduct. Basing its claim on the directive that "peaceful pick-
eting . involving any labor dispute" could not be enjoined
United States Supreme Court decisions would not be applicable in the determination,
since there was no question of federalism presented in a conflict between a state
agency and a state court. The court in Kaplan's Fruit dismissed this issue by stating
that the decisions were based upon a desire to avoid conflicting adjudications between
agencies and courts. Therefore the federalism cases were applicable to both the fed-
eral and state court systems confronting administrative agencies.
39. Id. at 72, 603 P.2d at 1348-49, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
40. Id. at 73, 603 P.2d at 1349, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
41. Id. at 73-74, 603 P.2d at 1349, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
42. Id., 603 P.2d at 1349-50, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53.
43. See note 3, supra.
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by "any judge, '4 7 the Union alleged next that the Moscone
Act barred the courts from issuing an injunction against union
activity obstructing access.4 8 The express language of the Act,
according to the Union, prevented the issuance of an injunc-
tion by the superior court because Kaplan's sought to enjoin
peaceful access obstruction, and a judge may enjoin labor ac-
tivity only when it involves "fraud, violence or breach of
peace."' 9 The court responded that subdivision (e) of the
Moscone Act lists separately "breach of peace" and the "un-
lawful blocking of access," thereby intimating that they are
different.50 The court further noted that subdivision (e) ex-
plicitly states that the section is not intended to prohibit in-
junctions against obstructing access.5 1
An apparent discrepancy existed, therefore, between the
protection of peaceful picketing in subdivision (b) and the ex-
plicit approval of injunctions against obstructed access in sub-
division (e). Logically, an injunction against non-violent ac-
cess obstruction could not be prohibited by subdivision (b)
while being allowed by subdivision (e).
The court reconciled this disparity by obeying the legisla-
tive directive to strictly construe the statutue "in accordance
with existing law" to avoid "unnecessary judicial interfer-
ence."'52 Previous California case law had defined "breach of
peace" as a "disruption of public order by acts that are them-
selves violent or tend to incite others to violence."' 3 While ob-
structing access is not necessarily a breach of peace, it does
have the potential to lead to violence.5 The court cited Inter-
national Molders v. Superior Court5" which held access ob-
struction to be enjoinable because there existed "threat[s] of
47. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.3(b)(2) (West 1979).
48. 26 Cal. 3d at 76, 603 P.2d at 1351, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
49. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.3(b)(1) (West 1979).
50. 26 Cal. 3d at 77 n.13, 603 P.2d at 1352 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 755 n.13.
51. Id. at 77, 603 P.2d at 1352, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 755. Subdivision (e) of CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.3 states that "it is not the intent of this section to permit
conduct that is unlawful including . . . the unlawful blocking of access or egress to
premises where a labor dispute exists." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 527.3(e) (West 1979).
52. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.3(a) (West 1981).
53. 26 Cal. 3d at 77 n.13, 603 P.2d at 1352 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 755 n.13. The
court failed to distinguish the definition of "breach of peace" in In re Bushman, 1
Cal. 3d 767, 773, 463 P.2d 727, 730, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375, 378, (1970), as that case dealt
with a different statute, namely CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.
54. 26 Cal. 3d at 77 n.13, 603 P.2d at 1352 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 755 n.13.
55. 70 Cal. App. 3d 395, 138 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1977).
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violence" from the "absence of restrictions on picketing" that
interfered with access. 56 Violence is a threat or probable con-
sequence of obstructing access, and because of this "threat,"
the superior court could enjoin the Union's activity as not be-
ing the protected peaceful picketing of subdivision (e) of the
Moscone Act.
The Union contended that the discrepancy between the
two subdivisions should be reconciled by construing the term
"unlawful" in subdivision (e) 7 to mean that relief for ob-
structed access is limited to an action at law.5 8 The equitable
relief of an injunction would then be unavailable. Although
Justice Newman, concurring, agreed with this interpretation,"5
the court concluded that the "common sense" use of the word
should prevail, because any other interpretation would be
"narrow, technical, and unsound."60
The court's decision effectively empowers the judiciary
with the ability to hear, at least initially, any primary farm
labor dispute. By ruling that neither the ALRA nor the Mos-
cone Act preempts superior courts from enjoining obstruction
to access, the court encourages parties charging such obstruc-
tion in a primary labor dispute to engage in forum shopping
to take advantage of local prejudices. As Justice Newman
points out, it is "disappointing" that the court chooses to
needlessly regress to the status quo before the ALRA 1
The California Supreme Court did issue a warning that
"caution and precision" should prevail in weighing the evi-
dence when granting an injuntion 2 Vacating the order below,
the court expressed a strong suspicion that the superior court
did not "engage in the process of weighing the evidence.""
However, any reprimand implicit in the court's statement was
nullified by the observation that the evidence had not been
56. 26 Cal. 3d at 78, 603 P.2d at 1352-53, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
57. See note 51, supra.
58. 26 Cal. 3d at 79, 603 P.2d at 1353, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
59. Id. at 83-84, 603 P.2d at 1356, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 759 (Newman, J.,
concurring).
60. Id. at 79, 603 P.2d at 1353, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
61. Id. at 84-85, 603 P.2d at 1357, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 759-60 (Newman, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 81, 603 P.2d at 1354, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
63. Id. at 80, 603 P.2d at 1354, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 757. The court noted that the
findings of fact conflicted between the ALRB and the superior court regarding the
existence of access obstruction.
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evaluated because the superior court believed "it lacked juris-
diction to enjoin blocking of access."6
The court's effective removal of the state agency from
regulation of many possible farm labor controversies, and its
granting to the court of primary jurisdiction over such mat-
ters, creates a potential for abuse.66 A study of recent farm
labor cases suggests that very little evidence is actually
"weighed" before a temporary restraining order is issued."
Further, the issuance of a temporary restraining order can
"terminate the entire controversy '67 by tying the farm work-
ers' hands during the entire short harvest season, which is the
farm workers' most economically effective interval. Any in-
junction, therefore, cautioned the court, should be narrowly
framed to safeguard "presumptively protected" activity and
to limit abuse of the injunctive process in the farm labor
field. 8
Mark Hannah
64. Id. at 80, 603 P.2d at 1354, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
65. Id. at 81, 603 P.2d at 1354, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 757. The court was careful to
avoid the impression that the superior court's decision in this case was an example of
judicial abuse. The issue of judicial abuse was not even suggested until after the pre-
sent proceeding had been disposed of by remand.
66. See Shatz, note 13, supra.




SECURITIES REGULATION-RULE 10b-5: A MERE
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE, ABSENT A DUTY TO DIS-
CLOSE NON PUBLIC INFORMATION, DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE A VIOLATION OF RULE 10b-5 OR SECTION-
1O(b)-Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Vincent Chiarella was employed as a "markup man"' in
the composing room of Pandick Press, a printing concern
hired by several corporations. Between September 1975 and
November 1976, Chiarella handled the copy for five separate
takeover bids involving these corporations: four tender offers
and one merger. Despite measures taken to insure confidenti-
ality,' Chiarella, combining his expertise as a stock trader and
the information contained within documents, deduced the
identities of the acquiring companies and the target compa-
nies. Chiarella then purchased stock in the target companies.
When each tender offer or merger was publicly announced,
Chiarella immediately sold his purchased shares for a profit,
netting more than $30,000 over the course of fourteen
months.3
In early 1977, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) initiated an investigation of the employee's stock trad-
ing activities. In May, Chiarella entered into a consent decree
in which he agreed to return all profits from his use of non
public information in stock trading." That same day, Chiarella
was fired by his employer.
Eight months later Chiarella was criminally indicted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York on seventeen counts of willful misuse of material
© 1981 by Mary Beth Long
1. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). When copy from a cus-
tomer arrived in the shop, it went first to Chiarella. After selecting the type fonts and
page layouts, he then passed the manuscript on for typesetting. United States v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978).
2. The type was initially set with certain vital information absent or in code.
For example, when Emhart Corporation sought to purchase control of USM Corpora-
tion, the documents originally delivered to Pandick Press read "Arabia Corp." and
"USA Corp." On the night before press release, the true names were inserted into the
final copy. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978).
3. See, 588 F.2d at 1363 n.3, for a complete record of transactions identifying
both acquiring companies and the companies targeted for takeover.
4. SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77, Civ. 2534 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1977).
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non public information in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities. After unsuccessfully moving to dismiss the
indictment for failure to state a crime, defendant was con-
victed by a jury on all seventeen counts of violating section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)'
and SEC rule 10b-5. The court instructed the jury that a vio-
lation of the rule had occurred if it found that Chiarella had
willfully failed to inform sellers of target company securities
that he possessed material information 7 which would catapult
the value of that stock once the information became public."
Based on these instructions, the jury found that the rule had
been violated.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion and held that anyone (corporate insider or not) who regu-
larly receives material non public information may not use
that information to trade in securities without first incurring
an affirmative duty to disclose. And if the information cannot
be disclosed, the person must abstain from buying or selling
the securities.9 The Second Circuit thus framed a "regular ac-
cess to market information"10 test premising the duty to dis-
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act makes it a crime to
willfully violate the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. II 1976). Chiarella was convicted
of 17 counts of violating the Act because he had received 17 letters confirming the
purchases of securities.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of :
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
7. The test of "materiality" is whether a reasonable investor would consider the
information important in determining his course of action. See, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
8. Chiarella is the first case in which criminal liability has been imposed upon a
purchaser for § 10(b) non disclosure. 588 F.2d at 1373. Chiarella was fined and sen-
tenced to one year in prison, which was suspended except for one month and a five
year probation. Id. at 1364 n.7.
9. Id. at 1365.
10. "Market information" concerns transactions in a corporation's securities
that will have an impact on their prices, independent of expected changes in the cor-
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close on regular access to non public information."
On certiorari,"2 the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction, holding that absent a duty to disclose
arising from a special relationship between buyer and seller,
there is no criminal liability under section 10(b) of the Act or
the regulations. Moreover, non disclosure can constitute fraud
under rule 10b-5 only where there exists a duty to disclose
arising from that special relationship. Thus, in a 6-3 opinion,' s
the Court found that: (1) no duty arose from impersonal mar-
ket transactions; and (2) no broad duty to disclose existed
merely because an individual possessed material, non public
information.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first considered
the language of the statute and its legislative history. 4 Al-
though acknowledging that section 10(b) was a catch-all
clause designed to deter fraudulent trading practices, he
found no specific guidance from the statutory language 5 or
legislative history 6 in addressing the issue of silence as a vio-
poration's earning power or assets. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial
Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
798, 799 (1973); ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, comment 2(j) at 657 (1980).
11. The Court of Appeals relied on Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972), as the historical basis for duty based on regular access to market
information. In that case, a Utah bank acted as transfer agent for shares of Ute De-
velopment Corporation, which was federally created to hold assets for a group of
mixed blood Ute Indians. Two markets existed; a primary market consisting of Indi-
ans selling to whites through the bank, and, unknown to the Indians, a higher resale
market consisting entirely of whites. Employees of the bank who bought shares from
the Indians and resold to whites for a substantial profit were held liable under rule
10b-5 due to their market position and regular access to special information.
12. Cert. granted, Chiarella v. United States, 441 U.S. 942 (1979).
13. The majority decision by Justice Powell was joined by Justices Stewart,
White, Rehnquist, and Stevens. The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justice Marshall, dissented. Separate concurring opinions were submitted by Justices
Stevens and Brennan.
14. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1979) (citing Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)). In Ernst, an accounting firm which negli-
gently and mistakenly reported an inaccurate corporate financial position, was held
not liable under section 10(b), although they had an affirmative duty to investigate
the truth of the data they received. The Court found that the language of the anti-
fraud statute did not extend liability for negligence.
15. The clause is couched in broad terms: "it shall be unlawful for any person
... [t~o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... " 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5(a) (1979).
16. See Security Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (1942). The
SEC does not discuss the implications of silence and subsequent liability under §
10(b). Contra, ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 262(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978), which
acknowledges that "silence when there is a duty to . . .speak may be a fraudulent
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lation of section 10(b).
Citing SEC1 7 and federal court decisions'8 which upheld
civil liability for section 10(b) non disclosure violations by cor-
porate insiders, Justice Powell found duty to be the critical
element in these administrative and judicial determinations of
fraud. From these cases, Justice Powell concluded that, in a
situation where the individual fails to disclose material infor-
mation, he commits fraud only where he has a duty to dis-
close. This duty arises from a fiduciary or similar relation of
trust and confidence between traders.'
In Chiarella, the Court held that the petitioner's use of
non public information was not fraud under section 10(b) un-
less there was an affirmative duty to disclose.20 The Court,
however, failed to address whether Chiarella in fact owed a
duty to disclose or refrain by reason of his employment with
the printing company. Rather, the Court found error in the
trial court's failure to give sufficient jury instructions regard-
ing the critical element of a duty to disclose, namely, a special
relationship between traders. Thus, the Court rejected the
broader concept of duty established by the trial court's "ma-
act."
17. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (broker/dealer was held liable for
trading on non public information, even though the stock was sold to persons not
previously stockholders). Premised on the insider's easy access to non public informa-
tion and the inherent unfairness of allowing an insider to trade without requiring
disclosure, Cady reaffirms the standards of common law fraud (i.e., a duty arising
from a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust or confidence must exist). For a dis-
cussion of the element of common law fraud see James & Gray, Misrepresentation
Part II, 37 MD. L. REv. 488, 523-27 (1978).
18. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Two
corporate insiders were held in violation of the antifraud provisions of securities laws
because they disclosed material inside information to individuals who subsequently
entered into transactions on the basis of that information. See also Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
19. 445 U.S. at 228. The Court cited General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus. Inc.,
403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), to support the
proposition that a purchaser of stock who is neither an insider nor a fiduciary owes no
duty to disclose material facts to a seller.
20. The purpose of such a duty guarantees that corporate insiders who have an
obligation to place the shareholders' welfare before their own, will not benefit person-
ally through fraudulent use of material non public information. 445 U.S. at 230. But
see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848, which suggests a broader policy
concern: "[tihe Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information."
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terial, non public information"'" test for liability. Further-
more, the Court determined that the Second Circuit's "regular
access to information" test was unworkable and "insufficient
to support a duty to disclose.
2 2
Although Justice Powell recognized that the Second Cir-
cuit sought to maintain a system insuring equal access to nec-
essary information in securities trading,28 he found two flaws
in the court's reasoning. First, every instance of financial ineq-
uity does not constitute fraud under section 10(b).2 ' Second,
and most importantly, the element of duty required to make
nondisclosure fraudulent was not demonstrated in Chiarella.
Refusing to impose a general duty on all participants of mar-
ket transactions based solely on the use of material non public
information, the Court found that no duty had resulted from
Chiarella's impersonal, arm's length transactions with sellers
of target company securities.
The Court relied both on the Williams Act 25 and the
SEC's more recent application of section 10(b),2 yet declined
to extend liability in the Chiarella case. Justice Powell noted
that the Williams Act "limits but does not completely pro-
hibit"27 a tender offeror's purchases of target stock prior to
public announcement of the offer. He concluded, therefore,
that Congress had not intended broad and unending liability
under section 10(b).2 8 Similarly, the Court cited the SEC's ac-
tion to bar "warehousing"2 9 under its power to regulate tender
21. 445 U.S. at 231.
22. Id., at 231 n.14. The Court emphasized that a duty arises from a relation-
ship between parties and not merely from one's ability to acquire information be-
cause of his position in the marketplace.
23. Id. at 232.
24. Justice Powell interpreted the Court of Appeals decision as "rest[ing] solely
upon its beliefl that the federal securities laws have 'created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions.'"
Id. (quoting 588 F.2d at 1362).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (Supp. I1 1978). The Williams Act imposes dis-
closure obligations on potential tender offerors whenever they purchase more than
five percent of the stock of a target company.
26. See, e.g., SEC Proposed Rule § 240.14e-3, 44 Fed. Reg. 70352-55, 70359
(1979).
27. 445 U.S. at 233.
28. Id. at 233-34. The Second Circuit, however, had rejected this same argu-
ment on the basis that the purpose of the Williams Act was to prevent the "stampede
effect" associated with tender offers, not simply to limit § 10(b) liability. 588 F.2d at
1367.
29. "Warehousing" occurs when a proposed tender offeror gives advance notice
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offers, rather than under section 10(b), as a significant indica-
tion that the SEC meant to limit the scope of section 10(b)
liability.30 Refusing to read the 1934 Act "more broadly than
its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit,"'"
the Court reversed the criminal conviction.2
In concurring opinions, Justices Stevens and Brennan
emphasized that the decision rested on the fact that Chiarella
was convicted on improper jury instructions. Justice Brennan
would have supported a broad theory of liability, but con-
curred in the decision because no standard for determining
liability was presented to the jury. Justice Stevens went so far
as to say that "we [have not] held that similar actions must be
considered lawful in the future."83
Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, in dis-
senting opinions,"4 favored the appellate court's broad inter-
pretation of section 10(b). The Chief Justice would have inter-
preted section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as extensions of tort law,
such that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic infor-
mation has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading."" Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
Marshall, emphasized: "Indeed, I think petitioner's brand of
manipulative trading, with or without such [employer's] ap-
proval, lies close to the heart of what securities laws are in-
tended to prohibit.""
The antifraud provisions of rule 10b-5 serve principally as
protective devices to prevent overreaching by public investors.
Since the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision,"7 rule 10b-5 has come
of the proposal to institutional investors who then purchase the target company stock
before the public announcement of the takeover bid. 445 U.S. at 234.
30. The SEC recognized that warehousing and insider trading rest on a "some-
what different theory." The Court, however, failed to delineate the new and different
theories of liability which fall outside the realm of § 10(b). Id.
31. Id. (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
32. 445 U.S.at 237. The Court refused to rule on whether Chiarella owed a duty
to the acquiring corporation because of his position as an employee with the printing
concern hired by the corporation. This theory, presented by the respondent as an
alternative ground for affirmation of the conviction was not submitted to the jury. On
that basis, the Supreme Court refused to consider this argument. Id., at 235-36. See
also, Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979).
33. 445 U.S. at 238.
34. Id. at 239, 245 (Burger, C.J. and Blackmun, J. dissenting opinions
respectively).
35. Id. at 240.
36. Id. at 246.
37. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
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to embody the "disclose or refrain" rule which provides that
persons who possess material non public information about
the value of an enterprise's securities cannot buy or sell the
securities unless they first disclose the information.
The disclose or refrain rule has been the standard used
by the SEC and the courts in establishing civil liability under
rule 10b-5. Born in an era of growing disenchantment with
manipulative practices in securities markets,"5 the disclose or
refrain rule was initially invoked against corporate insiders
and then was extended against "tippees" e and non insiders,
such as brokers trading on information affecting securities
prices.4 0 Later antifraud provisions, such as section 206 of the
Investment Advisors Act 4 1 and the Williams Act,"' expanded
the scope of traditional section 10(b) restrictions governing
broker/dealers, investment advisors and tender offerors. Re-
cent court decisions and proposed SEC regulations43 confirm
the trend toward a more liberal and expansive interpretation
of liability under section 10(b). In Chiarella, the Court se-
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
38. Section 9 of the Securities and Exchange Act was aimed at the practices of
professionals or regulars forming "pools" to raise or lower, i.e. manipulate, securities
prices in order to facilitate their purchase or sale of stock at a profit. See SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58, 76 (1963).
39. The SEC includes as tippees all persons who obtain material non public
information from a corporate source and who have reason to know that such informa-
tion was disclosed "improperly by selected revelation or otherwise." Investors Man-
agement Co., 66 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971). See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af'd,495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974) (Tippee who'received inside information from Merrill Lynch and traded on it
was found liable under section 10(b). The tippee's obligation was premised on his role
as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty). See also
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
40. Recent cases and SEC proposals suggest that the disclose or refrain rule
governs broker's behavior upon receipt of market information. See, e.g., Zweig v.
Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979) (newspaper columnists sought tp scalp
public investors); Oppenheimer & Co., SEC Exchange Release No. 12319, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) §§ 80, 551 (April 2, 1976). See generally
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1979). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau
Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
43. 44 Fed. Reg. 9954 (1979) (to be codified if approved in 17 C.F.R. § 240).
Promulgated under the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp.II 1978), these regula-
tions impose a disclose or refrain obligation on all persons who have knowledge of an
impending takeover bid.
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verely restricted the trend toward parity of information and
equal access to that information..
The Chiarella decision apparently rests on the failure of
the trial court to properly instruct the jury regarding the duty
to disclose which arises from a special relationship between
traders. Upon closer examination, however, the decision may
be explained as a result of the court's concern over the contin-
uing expansion of securities liability. The Court's narrow
reading of the scope of section 10(b) criminal liability seems
contrary to recently proposed SEC regulations."" These regu-
lations, promulgated under section 14(e) of the Williams
Act, 45 extend beyond the traditional corporate and market in-
sider categories of liability. As the SEC suggests, these regula-
tions will help narrow the gap of permissable trading activity
even further, although limited to the tender offer context.46 It
is apparent that SEC interpretations and the Supreme Court's
view do not coincide. Recently, the Supreme Court held that
official interpretations by the Federal Reserve Board and staff
were to be given great deference by courts, unless "demon-
strably irrational.' '47 Like the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC
has been delegated expansive authority to interpret the con-
gressional aims, promulgate regulations, and expand the legal
framework governing securities regulations. Thus, while the
Supreme Court cites SEC case law and policy, but declines to
apply it, one may interpret Chiarella as fundamentally at
odds with prior Court decisions in the areas concerning statu-
torily empowered government agencies.
While Chiarella was not exactly a sympathetic party since
he admitted trading on "confidential" '48 information, nuances
of the Chiarella case may have persuaded the Court to adopt
a more limited view of the duty concept than it would other-
wise have chosen to adopt. Chiarella was the first individual
ever to be prosecuted under the criminal provisions of section
10(b). Furthermore, criminal prosecution began only after the
civil litigation had ended with the result that Chiarella re-
turned all profits and lost his job. Arguably, one may infer
from Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, that this may be the
44. See note 43 supra.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp.II 1978).
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 9977 (1979).
47. Milhollin v. Ford Motor Co., 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
48. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978).
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right situation, but the wrong defendant to catch in the sec-
tion 10(b) antifraud net.4' Based on similar facts, the Su-
preme Court may impose a broader view of section 10(b) lia-
bility, finding that a duty exists between all traders in
securities.
It is not clear, however, whether a broader interpretation
promoting equal access to information is desirable. If a com-
prehensive rule were adopted, significant administrative
problems would arise. While market and corporate insiders
are readily identified and easily policed,50 it would be far more
difficult to scrutinize the activities of all persons who do not
regularly receive non public information. Furthermore, en-
forcement of the antifraud provisions against these persons
would be difficult and costly."1
It is also arguable that the Chiarella Court wanted to
preserve incentives for legitimate investigative activity be-
tween buyers and sellers of corporate securities. The preserva-
tion of desirable economic activity and administrative conve-
nience are ongoing concerns which the Supreme Court must
confront before extending the duty to disclose or refrain to all
insider trading. These concerns, however, must be balanced
against the overall purposes for enacting such antifraud legis-
lation: to insure integrity in securities transactions and to in-
spire confidence in the market.
The Chiarella case stands for the proposition that a fail-
ure to disclose violates section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 only when
the relationship between the parties establishes a duty to dis-
close. The Court's approach minimizes the importance of
Chiarella's access to confidential market information: the
common investor, no matter how diligently he tries, cannot
legally obtain the same information, and is thus at a disad-
vantage when trading. The Court's holding advances an inter-
pretation of the disclose or refrain rule which stops short of
the full implications and expectations of the original antifraud
49. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 238 (1979). Justice Stevens ex-
pressly states that future actions similar to those of Chiarella may not necessarily be
considered lawful.
50. A "tippee" trading rule is broader and, therefore, less administrable. It is,
however, limited by the requirement that the information must come from an insider.
51. The SEC would not be able to identify and police all those persons who
might, on a single occasion, obtain non public information. Reliance on private ac-
tions as a policing tool would most likely result in random enforcement.
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legislation and the recent SEC proposals to extend liability
under section 10(b). Future decisions, however, may prove
otherwise. Given the proper defendant and the proper jury in-
structions, the Court may extend liability under section 10(b),
finding a broader duty exists between traders in securities.
Mary Beth Long
